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CULTIVATING INCLUSION
Patrick S. Shin *
Mitu Gulati **
Twenty-five years ago, law schools were in the developing stages of a
pitched battle for the future of legal education and academia. Faculties
fought over the tenure cases of minority candidates, revealing deep divisions
within legal academia on questions about the urgency of racial
diversification and the merits of critical race scholarship. The students in
charge of the law reviews where this scholarship was emerging engaged in
their own battles, arguing over the use of affirmative action in the selection
of law review editors and then, as neophyte editors, staking their own
positions in the “What is legal scholarship?” debates. As students during this
period, we could not avoid reflecting on our own attitudes toward the
relevance of race in the legal profession and on the value of legal scholarship
about race.
Looking back at that time from the perspective of our current positions,
we are renewed in our admiration of and appreciation for Professor
Matsuda’s scholarship. She was a central figure in the then-emergent critical
race movement, and her work was a focus in discussions about the field. 1
Through her fearless and unwavering writings, Matsuda helped spur changes
in attitude and perspective within legal academia that prepared the way for
other scholars of color. Equal to her impact within the academy was the
inspiration she provided to a generation of prospective Asian American legal
scholars. In her example, we saw the possibility that our voices might be
heard inside the enclave of legal academia.
The idea that established communities have strong reasons to attach
value to the voices and perspectives of outsiders is a theme that runs through
much of Matsuda’s scholarship. In this Essay, we examine Matsuda’s
application of this idea in two articles on affirmative action: an influential
early piece, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.
** Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Our thanks to Adrienne Davis
and Richard Delgado for including us in this symposium, to Richard for his comments on a
draft of this Essay, and to Guy-Uriel Charles and Devon Carbado for numerous conversations
about the topics herein.
1. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 706 n.4, 750–51 (discussing Matsuda’s work); Randall L.
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989) (same).
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Plowed-Up Ground, 2 and one written fifteen years later, Who Is Excellent? 3
We offer some reflections on the ways in which Matsuda’s arguments relate
to current thinking about affirmative action and the value of diversity.
What strikes us as distinctive about Matsuda’s arguments for affirmative
action in Planting Seeds and Who Is Excellent? is that they are not primarily
framed as arguments derived from principles of justice or equality. Although
Matsuda elsewhere suggests that affirmative action might be justified as a
form of reparations, 4 she does not make that her argument in these two
pieces. Rather, in Planting Seeds, Matsuda argues in favor of affirmative
efforts to recognize and validate minority scholarship as a means of
increasing the scope, robustness, and reach of legal knowledge. 5 In Who Is
Excellent?, she argues for affirmative action in university admissions as a way
to foster “deep learning” 6 and “critical thinking.” 7 According to the view that
Matsuda articulates, affirmative action in legal academia and in legal
education is not a matter of giving minorities a leg up for the sake of
achieving broad goals of social justice or racial equality. While she does not
deny that these goals may also be served, in Planting Seeds and Who Is
Excellent?, she seeks to justify affirmative action in legal academia and
education not in terms of these external social goals but in terms of internal
values that fundamentally define those institutions. She presents affirmative
action as a natural extension of our commitment to open inquiry and critical
thinking that will benefit academia and education on their own terms,
regardless of any associated positive benefits for society as a whole.
In the arena of scholarship, affirmative action, according to Matsuda,
means constructive engagement with the work of outsiders that might not be
deemed worthy of notice under traditional filters. 8 Matsuda’s reason for
extending our engagement in this way is rooted in the very nature of the
scholarly enterprise. We should engage with unfamiliar scholarship because
this will increase our legal knowledge. And we must care about increasing
knowledge if we care about scholarship at all, because that is just what

2. Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in PlowedUp Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Planting Seeds].
3. Mari J. Matsuda, Who Is Excellent?, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 29 (2003) [hereinafter
Who Is Excellent?].
4. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 397 (1987); see also CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J.
MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 231–44 (1997).
5. Planting Seeds, supra note 2, at 8.
6. Who Is Excellent?, supra note 3, at 32.
7. See id. at 36–37.
8. See Planting Seeds, supra note 2, at 7.
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scholarship is. Similarly, for educators, affirmative action is about opening
the learning community to outsider perspectives. The reason for doing so is
that this will enrich discourse and challenge students to think critically about
conventional assumptions. 9 And we must care about pushing our students in
this way insofar as we care about educating them at all, because that is just
what education is. Thus, on Matsuda’s view, affirmative action serves values
that are constitutive of the institutions of legal scholarship and education. 10
Matsuda’s early writing about affirmative action may seem at first to
resonate with the now-standard view that affirmative action can be justified
by a compelling interest in diverse communities of higher learning and
discourse. When we read more carefully, however, we notice that the words
“diversity” and “diverse” never appear in Planting Seeds. Matsuda there
expresses little interest in racial or other demographics as such. Rather, her
concern is more directly rooted in ideals of intellectual empathy. She strives
for a community in which “the perspective of outsiders is considered as a
matter of course . . . and is expressed freely without fear of being labeled
irrelevant or unrealistic.” 11 Matsuda’s hope in Planting Seeds is that through
affirmative action, “we will live and work a different kind of academic life.” 12
This is not just a matter of increasing the representation of racial minorities
in the academic community but is, as she puts it, a commitment that
requires active development of our “social skill at integrated life.” 13
In Who Is Excellent?, which was written around the time of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Grutter, 14 Matsuda does identify the importance of
increasing the diversity of student bodies as a reason for affirmative action. 15
But even here, it is clear that she is not merely advocating for the admission
of racial minorities in higher numbers. She agrees with critics of racial
identity politics in rejecting “identity grouping as an end in itself” 16 but
thinks of the experience of racial identity as one source of different
understandings of the world. Again, Matsuda’s goal is more than changing
9. See Who Is Excellent?, supra note 3, at 36–37.
10. In Who Is Excellent?, Matsuda also suggests a somewhat analogous argument in the
context of private employment. She recounts discussions with businesspeople who explain how
having employees who can offer minority perspectives can help their companies make money.
See id. at 33–34. Although understanding different perspectives and promoting critical
thinking are not constitutive of business in the same way that they are of scholarship and
education, the idea is the same: affirmative action can be justified in terms of the internal
values of the institution that practices it.
11. Planting Seeds, supra note 2, at 9.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 10.
14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
15. Who Is Excellent?, supra note 3, at 36.
16. Id. at 41.
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the racial demographic of our students. Her interest in affirmative action
reflects, instead, a particular approach to the question, “What will we teach
them?” 17 Matsuda’s answer is that by seriously considering outsider
perspectives, we can take students “to the place of unheard of ideas.” 18
Re-reading Matsuda’s original account of affirmative action naturally
invites comparison with our modern understandings. Arguably, affirmative
action as envisioned in Matsuda’s writings is quite different from how we
tend to think of it today. In Planting Seeds and Who Is Excellent?, affirmative
action in academia and higher education is portrayed as a form of active
intellectual engagement with outsider perspectives, justified by the value of
knowledge and critical thinking. In contrast, according to the familiar postGrutter rationale, affirmative action is a decisionmaking procedure that
permits the consideration of race in admissions or hiring decisions, justified
by various benefits that flow from the resultant diversity. Some of these
benefits, such as enhanced classroom discourse, are consistent with
Matsuda’s goals for affirmative action. But the diversity rationale tells a
different story about how these beneficial consequences are achieved.
According to the diversity rationale articulated in Grutter, once a
community achieves a certain level of racial diversity (“critical mass”), a
bundle of benefits opens. 19 Discourse is enriched, stereotype-based thinking
is reduced, conscious and unconscious biases are eased, and cross-racial and
-cultural understandings are improved. 20 But it seems that we think of the
activation of these benefits as a mostly passive affair, a matter of social
science. The benefits of diversity materialize through the natural operation
of psychological mechanisms that accompany social contact. The
contemporary view seems to be that the purpose of affirmative action is to
manufacture diversity and then diversity itself takes care of the rest. On
Matsuda’s view in Planting Seeds and Who Is Excellent?, the work of
affirmative action is not limited to the moment of inclusion but instead
requires continuing efforts to incorporate new perspectives into our
scholarship and teaching. Affirmative action requires engagement after the
moment of inclusion. On the social science view, we tend to assume that
once we achieve sufficient heterogeneity in our community—which is no

17. Id. at 42.
18. Id. at 37.
19. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325, 329–30. The theory of “critical mass,” we suspect, is
intuitively plausible to many. But the empirical case is still a matter of considerable debate. See,
e.g., Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Does Critical Mass Matter?
Views from the Boardroom, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049 (2011).
20. See generally Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130
(2013).
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easy task, to be sure—diversity itself will then take over the work of social
integration. On Matsuda’s view, affirmative action consists in striving for the
“skill” of integration, not just creating the conditions from which integrative
benefits passively materialize.
The idea that diversity, once created, naturally yields socially beneficial
consequences has made affirmative action a highly user-friendly proposition.
This is not to minimize the level of principled commitment and political
resolve necessary to put an affirmative action policy or diversity initiative in
place. But there is a certain convenience in the notion that the integrative,
discourse-enriching benefits of diversity will be realized simply by virtue of
its mere existence. We do not doubt the science supporting the social contact
hypothesis, i.e., the notion that exposure to and contact with members of
out-groups can lead to reduced bias and stereotyping. 21 What we wonder,
though, is whether the diversity rationale has given rise to a tendency to
conflate the production of racial diversity with an intellectual commitment
to open inquiry and critical thinking—affirmative action in Matsuda’s sense.
The introduction of diversity may very well cause a reduction of
discriminatory attitudes that might be necessary for engaging with
unfamiliar ideas, but it may not be sufficient. Freedom from bias and
stereotypes is not the same thing as being intellectually open to outsider
perspectives, pursuing nontraditional modes of argument, or engaging in
critical thought. We wonder whether our fascination with diversity as a
mechanism for reducing bias has led us to think of diversity as a substitute
for the kind of intellectual engagement that Matsuda advocated in Who Is
Excellent? and Planting Seeds.
A community can be racially diverse in the sense of being formally
inclusive of minorities and yet still demand a high level of conformity in the
more performative aspects of identity. 22 Demographically diverse
institutions can still place significantly disparate burdens on individuals to
act in ways that support and reaffirm prevailing norms of appropriate,
normal, professional conduct and expression. A community can have a high
degree of racial diversity and still have a narrow mindset in judging “who is
excellent.” Perhaps in some contexts this narrowness is inescapable. Law
schools must think about whether an applicant will be able to pass the bar;
corporate firms must take into account project and client needs; faculties
must consider publication records. Our interest is not in finding fault.
Rather, our point is that the presence of demographic racial diversity implies
21. See Katharine Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of
Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1953–56
(2009); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2006).
22. See generally DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING
RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013).
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very little about the extent of genuine pluralism in a community’s cultural,
intellectual, and performative norms. 23
A further problem is that diversity is a vague and amorphous concept. It
is hard to pin down what diversity exactly is. 24 This makes it difficult to
distinguish institutions that are genuinely committed to diversity from those
that are merely good at talking the talk for the sake of goodwill. Additionally,
the vagueness of diversity, when combined with its dissociability from
particular substantive motives, gives rise to the possibility that the
promotion of diversity might be misused as cover for political agendas or to
mask ulterior interests. 25 Whatever one might say about the applicability of
the social contact hypothesis in that kind of scenario, 26 the production of
diversity under such circumstances would be a far cry from Matsuda’s vision
of affirmative action.
While we worry that current proponents of affirmative action expect the
production of diversity to do too much work for us as we move toward the
ideal of a more inclusive society, we do not advocate that the diversity
rationale be abandoned. For one thing, racial diversity is one important
answer to Matsuda’s question, “What is the best mix of people to spark the
interactions from which deep learning emerges?” 27 Diversity of race is
arguably a crucial aspect of the best mix. For another thing, one might argue
that the psychological mechanisms by which diversity reduces
discrimination have nothing to do with the motives by which that diversity is
created. 28 So, even if institutions engage in diversity initiatives for reasons
that are disconnected from the original ideals behind affirmative action,
those initiatives may still be a good thing insofar as they contribute to the
reduction of discriminatory attitudes.
The diversity rationale is different from Matsuda’s argument for
affirmative action. She saw affirmative action as serving values that are

23. And the fact that an institution claims a commitment to diversity implies even less.
Cf. Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017 (2011).
24. See id. at 1027–29.
25. Cf. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 570 n.46 (1984) (expressing skepticism about the efficacy
and signification of diversity-based affirmative action in admissions).
26. Social scientists have found that four key conditions are necessary in order for
intergroup contact to reduce discriminatory stereotypes: “equal status between the groups,
common goals, the interdependence of the groups, and the positive support of authorities,
laws, or custom.” Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1953–54 (discussing research confirming the
original findings of Gordon Allport, who first articulated the social contact hypothesis in
GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 281 (1954)).
27. Who Is Excellent?, supra note 3, at 32.
28. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Showcasing: The Positive Spin, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1055 (2011).
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constitutive of academic institutions. In contrast, the diversity rationale
seeks to justify affirmative action in terms of the broader social purpose of
reducing racial discrimination and inequality. This is, of course, a
compelling goal, and we agree that the creation of diversity in various
institutional settings is an important means to achieving it. Thus, we support
the diversity rationale for affirmative action. But we think that the creation
of racial diversity should be understood as but one step toward the ideal of
an inclusive community. Planting Seeds and Who Is Excellent? teach us that
affirmative action is not a policy that we can just put in place and then
passively reap the benefits. If we are not careful in first being clear as to what
benefits we are hoping to obtain from diversity and then working to ensure
that our diversity initiatives actually produce those benefits, we will end up
wasting resources that might be better spent elsewhere. Affirmative action is
hard work, and it is hard work that continues after the moment of inclusion.
The planting of seeds is a vivid metaphor, but, ironically, what Matsuda tells
us is that the heart of affirmative action is not in the planting. It is in the skill
required for successful cultivation.

